



## Data-to-Deal Series

### D2D Component 1

# POLITICS: SECURING POLITICAL SUPPORT – A BEST PRACTICE BRIEF

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### SUMMARY

This best practice brief presents Component 1 of the Data-to-Deal (D2D) framework, which focuses on securing political support. This component addresses the political and institutional foundations required to initiate and sustain credible transition planning. Strong political support anchors the transition process within government systems, aligns national priorities across ministries, and provides the authority needed to mobilise finance and implementation. Component 1 comprises four sub-components: (i) Creating a political

mandate, (ii) Establishing a governance structure, (iii) Assessing the national context, and (iv) Engaging with stakeholders. These sub-components together ensure that transition planning is politically grounded, institutionally coherent, and supported by broad-based ownership. The brief draws on case studies from countries including Costa Rica, The Gambia, and Chile to illustrate best practices in building political momentum and embedding transition processes within durable governance and decision-making frameworks.

### KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Executive intent should be formalised through binding administrative or legal instruments that anchor the transition within existing planning and budget systems.
2. A Governing Coordination Function should be established at the centre of government, with a structured link to the Ministry of Finance to ensure alignment between planning and financing.
3. A two-tier coordination structure should be institutionalised to link political direction with technical delivery.
4. A shared evidence and data platform should be created to enable transparent coordination across ministries and provide the information base required for investment preparation and due diligence.
5. Political economy capability should be embedded across core ministries to ensure reforms are sequenced in line with real incentives, institutional constraints, and coalition dynamics.

### CONTRIBUTING INSTITUTIONS



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This document forms part of a series of guidance notes, each focused on one D2D component. The series provides practical advice to governments and their partners on how to integrate D2D into national planning and financing processes. This series (available [here](#)) is co-authored by leading international organisations, along with contributors from LMIC countries, to reflect a collective perspective on how best to leverage investment for climate-aligned energy and transport transitions.

The primary audience for these briefs includes energy and transport policymakers in LMICs at national and subnational levels, as well as development partners and international organisations that provide technical and financial support. The guidance applies to both mitigation and adaptation priorities, while recognising that the balance between them will differ across country contexts.



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# 1. Introduction


Low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are working to transform major economic sectors to advance development priorities, meet climate commitments, and strengthen infrastructure resilience. Achieving these objectives will require accelerated socio-economic change across energy, transport, and other high-emitting sectors. Most countries, however, cannot achieve these transformations without mobilising much higher levels of finance [1].

The Data-to-Deal (D2D) framework (**Figure 1**), developed by over 75 global experts, provides a structured, evidence-based approach to help countries close this gap [1]. The framework consists of seven interlinked components – Politics, Capacity, Vision, Modelling, Engagement,

Policy, and Finance – that move from political commitment and institutional readiness through to financing. These components are designed to be adapted to national contexts, rather than be followed in strict sequence, and are they underpinned by sustained stakeholder engagement.

This brief focuses on **Component 1: Politics – Securing Political Support**, which aims to understand the local political economy and build high-level political commitment for the development of transition plans. This component involves analysing the national political context, facilitating dialogue among key institutions, defining appropriate governance structures, and securing a formal mandate to guide the broader D2D process.

**Figure 1: The D2D framework visualised.**



### 1.1 Inter-Linkages

Within the D2D framework, Component 1 links to the other components as outlined in **Table 1**.

**Table 1: Interactions between Component 1 and other Components of the D2D Framework.**

D2D Component	Link to Component 1: Politics
<b>2. Capacity: Developing institutional capacity</b>	<b>Component 2</b> strengthens the institutional foundation of the political mandate by identifying, supporting, and embedding coordination and delivery capacity within key ministries and agencies. This includes training national teams, defining focal points, and ensuring that technical expertise is sustained to implement politically endorsed plans. When capacity is developed within domestic institutions, delivery becomes locally owned and sustainable, reducing the need for outside support and reinforcing political ownership.
<b>3. Vision: Aligning the development vision</b>	<b>Component 3</b> translates the political mandate into a shared development vision. It clarifies which pathways are politically viable, aligns long-term climate and development objectives across ministries, and ensures that transition planning reflects domestic priorities rather than external agendas. Political leadership provides the authority to reconcile sectoral visions and prevent fragmentation.
<b>4. Modelling: Undertaking deliberative modelling</b>	<b>Component 4</b> operationalises the political mandate by quantifying what politically endorsed ambitions mean in financial, economic, and technical terms. Political leadership ensures access to data, cross-ministerial participation, and the integration of model outputs into policy decisions. In turn, credible analytical evidence strengthens political commitment by demonstrating the feasibility and trade-offs of different options.
<b>5. Engagement: Engaging with stakeholders</b>	<b>Component 5</b> builds on the legitimacy and coordination established under Component 1 to structure inclusive and purposeful engagement. The political mandate provides the authority to convene diverse actors, ministries, regulators, the private sector, and civil society, and to manage differing interests within a coherent process. Effective engagement, in turn, shapes and sustains political momentum through consensus and coalition-building.
<b>6. Policy: Enhancing the enabling environment</b>	<b>Component 6</b> translates political intent into the policy and regulatory reforms that underpin implementation. The political mandate clarifies institutional responsibilities and reform priorities, ensuring that proposed policies are both technically sound and politically feasible. By grounding reform in political realities, Component 1 helps make the enabling environment durable and credible to investors.
<b>7. Finance: Developing finance strategies</b>	<b>Component 7</b> converts political commitment into actionable financing strategies. The political mandate provides the anchor of credibility required by investors and development partners, while ensuring alignment with fiscal and budget processes. In turn, financial planning and mobilisation reinforce political leadership by demonstrating progress, accountability, and tangible results.

### 1.2. Value proposition

Building a strong political foundation for the transition process is an essential starting point, leading to the following value proposition.

- **Stronger country ownership and political buy-in.** Climate transition processes typically involve major development trade-offs and require substantial investment. Without broad and durable political support, transitions risk stalling or being blocked by opposing coalitions.
- **Improved sustainability and continuity.** Creating space for political dialogue and stakeholder engagement at the early stages of the transition helps reduce the risk of subsequent derailment. In practice, securing high-level political support is not a one-time achievement. It must be sustained and nurtured throughout the transition process.
- **Enhanced coordination and alignment.** Climate transition cuts across multiple sectors of the economy, calling for significant cross-sectoral collaboration. This makes it essential to involve all the relevant political actors and establish institutional mechanisms that ensure alignment and coordination across government and society.
- **Credible signals to investors and partners.** By translating executive intent into formal mandates, clear responsibilities, and durable coordination structures, governments demonstrate coherence, accountability, and long-term commitment. This political clarity builds confidence among development partners and private investors that national priorities are stable, actionable, and finance-ready.

### 1.3. Sub-components

Component 1 consists of four sub-components that collectively unpack the political challenges of the data-to-deal process:

1. **Creating a political mandate.** Secure high-level political support and identify national reform-minded champions. Where such mandate is not immediately available, pursue 'no regrets' measures to better prepare for future windows of political opportunity.
2. **Establishing a governance structure.** Identify the key institutional actors to collaborate across government, and establish a formal coordination mechanism, while remaining mindful of the informal institutional dynamics that shape decision-making.
3. **Assessing the national context.** Map the space for political manoeuvre by systematically surveying the policy environment, including international commitments as well as national development plans, strategies, and policies.
4. **Engaging with stakeholders.** Conduct early and genuine consultations with both national and relevant international stakeholders, with the aim of building broad-based supportive coalitions.

The remainder of this brief provides in-depth guidance on these four sub-components to support policymakers and their partners in operationalising transition plans through viable financing strategies. Throughout, the brief draws on concise case studies to illustrate practical applications, common pitfalls, and replicable solutions in diverse LMIC contexts.

# 2. Best Practice Guidelines

The following section presents best practice guidelines for Component 1, illustrated with case studies that highlight effective and less effective approaches. These best-practice guidelines are anchored in political economy thinking, which offers a structured lens to understanding power dynamics, institutional arrangements, and incentive systems that shape how energy and transport transition policies are designed and implemented [2].

### 2.1. Creating a political mandate

The first sub-component of Component 1 is creating a political mandate. Establishing a formal mandate ensures that the low carbon transition process is backed by high-level authority, clearly defined responsibilities, and political visibility. In practice, this involves securing explicit political direction, empowering reform-minded national champions, and preparing the groundwork for windows of opportunity when political support is not yet forthcoming. This section highlights three key elements that strengthen a political mandate:

- **Securing high-level political support.**
- **Identifying national champions.**
- **Laying foundations for political support.**

#### 2.1.1. Securing high-level political support

**High-level mandates, ideally from the presidency and supported at the ministerial level, can greatly strengthen and accelerate the climate transition process.** If enshrined in law, mandates are more likely to survive political leadership changes, providing more stability. The mandate should outline the scope and set clear responsibilities for implementation, requiring active participation by all relevant ministries and agencies. This helps to ensure directed efforts with wider government engagement, encouraging alignment between line ministries, some of which might otherwise not engage in

this type of planning process, and setting the stage for the shared national vision elaborated under Component 3: Vision.

In contexts where a top-down political mandate is not yet forthcoming, a compelling case must be made for its finance mobilisation potential. Quantifying the scale of finance that could be accessed, particularly from international financial institutions, national budgets, and private capital, helps demonstrate that transition planning is not merely a technical exercise but an investment opportunity. Benchmarking these opportunities against proven country experiences can further illustrate what is achievable when D2D-type processes are embedded in national policy. Emerging tools such as FinTrack [3], which map available finance sources, eligibility criteria, and conditionalities, can support governments in identifying concrete funding opportunities and tailoring policy actions accordingly. Early engagement with international partners can then validate these assessments and help align national actions with the conditions required to unlock such finance. These approaches are expanded in Component 7: Finance, which integrates such mapping into the design of national financing strategies, linking identified sources to specific policy measures and investment pipelines.

Political economy analysis (PEA) helps identify where real investment decisions are made and who influences them. D2D is most effective when its insights are integrated into these existing government processes, such as national infrastructure plans, resource allocation exercises, or fiscal reform programmes, because this is where priorities are set and funding decisions stick.

In contexts where such processes are not yet in place or are too weak to anchor action, D2D can instead begin as a targeted technical assistance initiative that demonstrates value in practice, helping to build demand and political space for a more formal decision-making process over time.

In many cases, political endorsement does not follow a strict sequence; analytical work, stakeholder engagement, and financing discussions may already be underway before a formal mandate is established. Transition planning should therefore be understood as iterative rather than linear, allowing countries to build momentum through existing technical work or emerging financing opportunities and to revisit earlier steps as political and institutional conditions evolve.

### **BOX 1. Case Study: A High-Level Political Mandate for Decarbonisation in Costa Rica.**

Costa Rica's experience highlights the catalytic effect of high-level political mandates in driving national climate transitions. In 2018, President Carlos Alvarado launched the National Decarbonisation Plan (NDP), committing the country to a long-term pathway toward net-zero emissions by 2050. The mandate was not merely a statement of intent but a directive for coordinated action across ministries, signalling to investors and development partners that the transition was a national priority. A relatively modest investment of USD 200,000 in technical analysis and stakeholder engagement laid the groundwork for unlocking over USD 2.4 billion in climate finance between 2019 and 2022. The NDP embedded decarbonisation within Costa Rica's development strategy, linking it explicitly to job creation, competitiveness, and public health. Costa Rica demonstrates how clear political direction, backed by analytical rigour and cross-ministerial coordination, can rapidly convert policy ambition into tangible finance mobilisation and sustained implementation. See [Jaramillo et al.](#), for more information [4].

### **2.1.2. Identifying national champions** **Reform-minded individuals who hold influence within or around government can sustain attention on the transition agenda and keep coordination mechanisms active.**

Identifying and working with reform-minded individuals – so-called "national champions" – can be especially valuable. They can initiate and steer the process, providing guidance and oversight, supporting institutionalisation and follow-up actions, and managing diverse stakeholder coalitions, even amid conflicting interests.

Potential champions are typically identified through an assessment of which actors already hold convening authority across ministries and command credibility with both domestic stakeholders and development partners. In most cases they are individuals who are already performing elements of a coordination role, even before it is formalised. These may include ministers, subnational champions, senior bureaucrats, or influential business figures with the credibility and authority to drive change.

To ensure continuity and alignment across government, the national champion should be embedded within the Governing Coordination Function (GCF), outlined in Section 2.2.2., and linked to the two-tier coordination structure that follows. Depending on the country context, leadership can emerge from various government levels or even outside government altogether. Their roles may include providing oversight, coordinating stakeholders, tracking progress, and mobilising resources [5, 6].

### **2.1.3. Laying foundations for political support** **Where immediate political endorsement is absent, preparatory work that strengthens capacity and builds an evidence base can create the conditions for future commitment.**

It is important to acknowledge that high-level political mandates may not always be immediately forthcoming, whether due to competing priorities, political sensitivities, or the absence of an opportune policy window. In such circumstances, national consensus on the relevance and approach to developing transition plans is often limited. Where this is the case, initiating the strategy within a smaller governance context can help create the political space for a broader, nationally owned process at a later stage – one that gradually builds momentum and legitimacy on the basis of evidence.

Even where such a limited governance approach is not feasible, countries can still take no-regrets actions that lay the groundwork for stronger engagement as the political context evolves. These actions help to build readiness, technical credibility, and institutional capacity so that, when political opportunities arise, governments are well-positioned to secure and implement a high-level mandate. Examples include:

- Identifying available sources of finance and clarifying the criteria and steps required to maximise finance mobilisation in line with national interests.
- Mapping the institutional steps and information flows required to deliver the strategy, identifying where mandates may be unclear or overlapping, capacity is constrained, or coordination mechanisms are weak.
- Investing in capacity development for ministry officials to strengthen understanding of climate–economy linkages. Component 2: Capacity provides guidance on how to institutionalise delivery functions, defining focal points, skill pipelines, and performance routines, so that political intent becomes an operational capability rather than a one-off announcement.
- Developing a national knowledge base through partnerships with universities and think tanks.

- Conducting pilot analytical exercises that demonstrate how decarbonisation pathways support national goals such as job creation, fiscal stability, and climate resilience.
- Undertaking peer-to-peer exchanges to learn from countries further along in the transition process.
- Advancing sectoral actions that align with climate objectives but are driven by non-climate levers, such as economic growth, job creation, or improved access (eg renewable energy or public transport investment).

### **BOX 2. Case Study: Building Political Momentum Through Early Analytical Work in Peru.**

Peru provides a clear example of how early technical analysis can lay the groundwork for broader political engagement. An initial net-zero assessment and cost-benefit study led by the Ministry of Environment helped demonstrate the economic rationale for long-term decarbonisation, catalysing a more inclusive, nationally owned Long-Term Strategy (LTS) development process that was later embedded in public policy. This evidence-based approach created the foundation for sustained political commitment once the opportunity for formal endorsement arose. As of September 2025, more than 40 low- and middle-income countries have submitted LTSs under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), reflecting growing recognition that early analytical work can build both credibility and political momentum for climate action. See [IDB](#) and [UNFCCC](#) for more information [7, 8].

### **2.2. Establishing a governance structure**

The second sub-component of Component 1 focuses on establishing a governance structure. Effective governance serves as the institutional backbone of the transition process, ensuring that roles are clear, coordination mechanisms are

functional, and both formal and informal dynamics are understood. In practice, this involves mapping the key government actors, designing transparent governance arrangements, and recognising how informal relationships shape formal structures. Four elements are central to effective governance:

- **Identifying relevant actors across government.**
- **Defining a formal governance structure.**
- **Developing coordination mechanisms.**
- **Understanding informal institutional dynamics.**

### **2.2.1. Identifying relevant actors across government**

**Bringing finance and sectoral ministries into the process early helps align fiscal priorities with transition objectives and reinforces institutional ownership.** Given the cross-cutting nature of climate change, stronger collaboration between line ministries, including finance ministries, is necessary. Effective coordination starts with early engagement to define the roles of line ministries and ensure that non-climate priorities (eg fiscal, social, and industrial) are reflected in the transition planning process. Getting this right is essential for legitimacy and for ensuring that the plan becomes integrated with decision-making rather than a parallel exercise.

Sectoral experts in line ministries have a key role in outlining the decarbonisation process for their sectors, including clarifying the type and scale of measures, any new regulations or changes to the regulatory framework, and the stakeholders needed around the table. They are also responsible for selecting and identifying projects for public funding that can support the implementation of the transition plan, reducing exposure to potential stranded assets and increasing resilience. Decisions at the sectoral level have implications for the transition as well as public finances. As a result finance ministries need to understand the sensitivity of different

areas of the economy to climate impacts to enable investments aligned with the national decarbonisation and development plans. Ownership and participation from finance ministries is crucial, as they are influential actors within government. Beyond interactions between individual line ministries, finance ministries have an overview of the economy and its development, and the convening power to ensure alignment between line ministries. In addition, finance ministries will ultimately be assessed on how effectively they guide the economy through the challenges posed by the transition, ensuring economic stability, prosperity, and sound public finances [9]. Helping them clarify their specific role in this process early on will be an essential step in this phase.

### **2.2.2. Defining a formal governance structure**

**Locating a coordination function at the centre of government creates a durable mechanism to oversee planning and manage collaboration across ministries.** Once key government actors are identified, it is essential to formally establish the governance structure – referred to as the Governing Coordination Function (GCF) – that will steer and coordinate the development of the Data-to-Deal (D2D) process across government. This Function sits at the core of the governance architecture and is responsible for facilitating interaction among institutions, defining responsibilities, and sustaining coordination across the subsequent components of the D2D framework.

The GCF should be positioned at the centre of government, typically within the Office of the Prime Minister or President, to enable it to bridge ministries and ensure whole-of-government engagement. It must also maintain a strong connection to the Ministry of Finance, which plays a critical role in overseeing budget releases, fiscal policy, and engagement with international finance institutions.

### **BOX 3. Case Study: Joint Leadership for Long-Term Strategy Development in The Gambia.**

The experience of The Gambia reinforces the importance of joint ministerial leadership and early coordination across key ministries in establishing effective governance arrangements. The country's Long-Term Climate-Neutral Development Strategy 2050, submitted as the national Long-Term Low Emission Development Strategy (LT-LEDS) under the UNFCCC, was jointly developed by the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, demonstrating strong institutional collaboration. This partnership enabled broad and inclusive stakeholder engagement, involving local authorities, civil society, the private sector, and development partners. It also ensured that the strategy was firmly anchored within national development priorities, including the goal of achieving middle-income country status. See [MECCNAR](#) for more information [10].

The GCF oversees both the Political Steering Committee – Special Interest Group (PSC-SIG), which provides political and strategic direction, and the Technical Delivery Group – Special Interest Group (TDG-SIG), which manages analytical and operational delivery. Together, these mechanisms ensure that political guidance, technical analysis, and fiscal planning move in step from the early data and planning stages through to finance mobilisation. The PSC-SIG and TDG-SIG serve as the key coordination mechanisms of the D2D governance architecture and are described in more detail in the following section.

This structure will vary by country and, in some cases, may build on existing ministerial or multi-stakeholder committees established under the climate process. Appointing joint ministerial co-leads can help broaden and drive the process, while a consultative approach that engages key sectors and ministries in co-designing the strategy can strengthen ownership and policy coherence.

To formalise this governance structure, countries may use governance memos, an approach commonly applied under the 2050 Pathways Platform (2050PP). These memos clarify the mandate, scope, and roles of all involved institutions and typically outline the responsibilities of the GCF, PSC-SIG, and TDG-SIG. They may also include terms of reference for each ministry, providing clarity and accountability.

Experience from countries such as Morocco, Costa Rica, and Guatemala under 2050PP shows that establishing the GCF early in the process significantly improves coordination, clarifies mandates, and accelerates progress toward finance mobilisation. By formally establishing the GCF at this point, countries lay the institutional foundation for the subsequent components of the D2D framework, ensuring that governance, coordination, and accountability mechanisms are in place from the outset.

### **BOX 4. Case Study Integrating the Ministry of Finance in Burkina Faso's LTS Process.**

Burkina Faso's experience highlights the central role of the Ministry of Finance within the governance structure, underscoring the need for its close involvement in both political and technical coordination mechanisms. The Ministry of Finance participated in all stages of the Long-Term Strategy (LTS) preparation process, including leadership in sectoral groups to integrate cross-cutting finance dimensions into LTS pathways; membership in the LTS Technical Monitoring Committee, analogous to the TDG-SIG, responsible for assessing data quality, analytical rigour, and implementation options; representation in the LTS Steering Committee; and leadership in reviewing and supporting the technical aspects of the strategy. This inclusive approach ensured that financing considerations were embedded from the outset, aligning the LTS with fiscal policy and national development priorities. See [Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action](#) for more information [11].

### 2.2.3. Developing coordination mechanisms

**Linking political steering with technical delivery helps maintain consistency between evidence generation, policy decisions, and financing actions.** Once a Governing Coordination Function (GCF) is in place, the next step is to ensure it functions effectively through coordination mechanisms that can align political direction, technical analysis, and financing. These mechanisms provide the “engine room” that translates political intent into sequenced actions, reduces duplication across ministries and development partners, and creates clarity for private investors.

In practice, coordination mechanisms work by aligning international support with national priorities and budget cycles, while ensuring that evidence and modelling feed directly into political decision-making. They help governments to structure the sequencing of reforms and investment pipelines, creating a coherent process that gives external partners and private investors a clear and credible point of engagement.

Coordination should be structured at two mutually reinforcing levels to ensure clear mandates, institutional alignment, and effective delivery. At the strategic level, a Political Steering Committee – Special Interest Group (PSC-SIG) acts as a government-led, multi-stakeholder platform that brings together domestic institutions, development partners, and private sector actors around a shared national plan. By committing the time of senior decision-makers with authority to direct their ministries and agencies, the PSC-SIG provides political direction, aligns international support with national priorities and budget cycles, and establishes the coherence required for implementation. This structure also provides a strategic forum for engagement with international financial institutions (IFIs) and development partners,

ensuring that external resources are channelled in support of government priorities and fiscal frameworks. Unlike traditional project-by-project approaches, this “country platform” model enables programmatic coordination, pooling finance and aligning it with a clear set of priorities, while providing a credible focal point for engagement.

#### **BOX 5. Case Study: South Africa’s coordination through a country platform – the JETP**

South Africa demonstrates how a two-tier coordination structure can link high-level political direction with technical delivery. The Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) serves as the country platform (analogous to the PSC-SIG), convened by the Presidency’s governance and coordination function (analogous to the GCF) to align ministries, development partners, and investors around a shared investment plan. Operating at the strategic level, it provides the political direction, coherence, and external engagement needed to mobilise concessional and private finance at scale. At the operational level, the Presidential Climate Commission (PCC) acts as the technical coordination group (analogous to the TCG-SIG), integrating modelling, finance planning, and stakeholder consultation into a unified analytical process. The PCC supports the preparation and monitoring of the Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET-IP), ensuring evidence informs decision-making and that financing flows are aligned with national priorities. Together, the JETP and PCC exemplify how structured coordination can translate political intent into actionable investment programmes, strengthen credibility with partners, and sustain implementation momentum. See [ODI Global](#) for more information [12].

At the operational level, a Technical Delivery Group – Special Interest Group (TDG-SIG) leads technical delivery and integration across government systems. The government should guarantee the contribution in kind of national technocrats, ensuring they are trained and supported to

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deliver the analytical and planning work required. The TDG-SIG acts as the engine responding to the GCF, facilitating the exchange of data, assumptions, and sector analyses, and ensuring that analytical outputs remain consistent with ministerial priorities. The TDG-SIG may include thematic working groups focused on data, systems modelling, or long-term planning, and should involve a local higher education institution to help identify skills gaps and support capacity development through targeted training.

The TDG-SIG can only operate effectively if the necessary analytical and managerial capacity is in place. Component 2 outlines how to design these delivery teams, establish data-sharing protocols, and ensure that skills transfer occurs through

partnerships with universities and technical institutions, preventing over-reliance on external consultants.

Together, this two-tiered structure operates under the oversight of the GCF, establishing a practical bridge between strategy and implementation. Ongoing interaction between the two mechanisms ensures that analytical outputs remain responsive to shifting policy priorities, while political guidance continues to be anchored in robust evidence.

**Table 2: How coordination mechanisms (PSC-SIG and TDG-SIG) enable delivery across D2D components. Note: PSC-SIG = Political Steering Committee – Special Interest Group; and TDG-SIG = Technical Delivery Group – Special Interest Group.**

D2D Component	PSC-SIG – Mandates & Direction	TDG-SIG – Analysis & Delivery
<b>1. Politics: Securing Political Support</b>	Builds and maintains high-level political commitment, brokers alignment across powerful actors, and provides the mandate for reforms to proceed.	Maps political incentives and constraints, provides political-economy insights to sequencing decisions, and supports coalition-building with evidence.
<b>2. Capacity: Developing institutional capacity</b>	Endorses capacity-development priorities, secures mandates, and budget signals, and embeds institutional strengthening objectives in ministry workplans.	Identifies skills gaps, partners with higher education institutions, and delivers targeted training, knowledge transfer, and institutional development.
<b>3. Vision: Aligning the development vision</b>	Aligns national development and climate priorities, resolves cross-ministerial inconsistencies, and ensures a coherent investment trajectory.	Integrates sectoral evidence and modelling, aligns assumptions across ministries, and prepares technical analyses that underpin national planning.
<b>4. Modelling: Undertaking deliberative modelling</b>	Commissions analytical work and ensures its findings inform policy cycles and decision-making.	Leads data management, technical modelling, and diagnostics (eg transition planning, cost benefit analysis), ensuring comparability across sectors.
<b>5. Engagement: Engaging with stakeholders</b>	Convenes inclusive national dialogues with government, private sector, and civil society, and legitimises engagement processes through a political mandate.	Organises technical consultations and stakeholder workshops, manages data-sharing platforms, and incorporates feedback into analysis and planning.
<b>6. Policy: Enhancing the enabling environment</b>	Authorises reform pathways, sequences policy decisions, and assigns institutional responsibilities for regulatory change.	Conducts policy analysis and regulatory reviews, drafts reform options, and supports implementation tracking and compliance checks.
<b>7. Finance: Developing finance strategies</b>	Approves financing strategies, aligns them with fiscal and budget cycles, and coordinates engagement with development partners and IFIs through the Ministry of Finance.	Maps financing requirements, harmonises application steps across funding windows, and prepares financial documentation and investment plans.

### 2.2.4. Understanding informal institutional dynamics

**Informal relationships and incentives often shape decision-making more than formal mandates, so recognising them is essential for sequencing realistic reforms.** The formal institutional frameworks governing the energy and transport sectors only tell part of the story. Informal norms, relationships, and practices often play an even more decisive role in shaping outcomes. In many contexts, personal networks, patronage systems, and unwritten agreements determine how energy and transport policies are interpreted, how contracts are awarded, and how reforms are either pursued or blocked. While formal institutions may appear robust on paper, their real-world functioning is often shaped by these informal dynamics. Political economy mapping can help to identify the informal systems that influence and underpin formal governance structures. This includes assessing the autonomy and capacity of key bodies such as energy ministries, regulators, and utilities, as well as the professionalism of bureaucracies and the degree of coordination across agencies. In doing so, analysts can identify where institutional bottlenecks lie, which reforms are feasible, and how change might best be sequenced.

### 2.3. Assessing the national context

The third sub-component of Component 1 is assessing the national context. Climate strategies must be anchored in the realities of national development priorities and link to sectoral strategies, such as national transport and energy plans, political drivers, and international commitments. A systematic assessment ensures coherence with broader policy frameworks while revealing opportunities and risks for reform. In practice, this means situating national processes within international mandates, mapping socio-economic priorities, and understanding the political incentives behind policy choices. This section highlights two areas of focus:

- Referencing international mandates.
- Mapping national socio-economic priorities.

#### 2.3.1. Referencing international mandates Integrating international climate commitments into national planning processes reinforces political credibility and strengthens engagement with partners.

It is helpful to begin by understanding how the national context fits into wider international frameworks, such as the Paris Agreement's Article 4.19, which calls for the development of Long-Term Low Emission Development Strategies (LT-LEDS) [13]. Another relevant United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) outcome is Decision 1/ CMA.5, adopted at COP28 in Dubai, which urges Parties to communicate LT-LEDS that support just transitions to net-zero emissions by or around mid-century [14: paragraph 42]. This international context can complement national mandates, such as national development plans or national climate laws that clearly establish the mandate for the development of the transition plan.

An important question is the extent to which national transition plans are coherent with such international commitments, including those made under the Paris Agreement, notably Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). While many countries have dedicated climate strategies, these are not always aligned with sectoral investment priorities or long-term development goals. Work in Asia shows that only 10% of the climate-related transport policies are included in the NDCs [15]. Mapping these interlinkages is essential for identifying potential policy inconsistencies or missed opportunities for alignment. It also helps assess the seriousness of political commitment to climate-compatible development. The analysis developed here forms the evidential base for Component 6: Policy, which shows how these political and economic realities are incorporated into sequenced policy reforms that balance investor confidence with social objectives.

### 2.3.2. Mapping national socio-economic priorities

#### Examining how transition objectives intersect with wider development goals helps identify feasible pathways that reflect domestic political realities.

It is also important to understand a country's wider socio-economic development priorities and how these may or may not relate to climate. These often include goals such as poverty reduction, employment generation, rural development, health, industrialisation, and economic growth. The energy and transport sectors sit at the intersection of these goals, with the potential to act both as a constraint and a catalyst. Mapping out these development priorities through an extensive review of plans, strategies, and policies is an important foundational task, since these often provide more concrete signals of long-term political direction. Their credibility, however, depends on the degree of political consensus they enjoy. Plans that survive electoral cycles and have support across different political factions, regions, and stakeholder groups are more likely to guide investment effectively.

Nevertheless, underlying political motivations are rarely made explicit in formal public documents. It is important to understand that political decisions are influenced by deep-rooted incentive structures such as how governments maintain legitimacy, manage power-sharing, and allocate economic benefits. Understanding these underlying drivers is a critical part of intelligence gathering, as they will also influence the process of climate transition. For example, a government may justify an increase in renewable energy investment or e-mobility on environmental grounds. However, the real motivation may lie in shifting control over energy assets, appeasing key constituencies, or consolidating influence over strategic infrastructure such as future transport systems. In other cases, leaders may

prioritise large infrastructure projects that offer visible political gains ahead of elections or use fuel subsidies to secure support from urban populations. By uncovering these motivations, it becomes possible to design strategies that reflect how decisions are truly made. This shifts the analysis from a narrow focus on what should happen to a more grounded assessment of what can happen and under what conditions.

Undertaking a structured political economy analysis before or during the process can be a helpful way of surfacing underlying political dynamics to inform the climate transition process. While political economy analysis must take a system-wide view, it is also important to examine the particular challenges that different sectors face. Political economy analysis can be government-led or externally supported, but the approach should be clearly defined to ensure comparability and credibility.

#### **BOX 6. Legal Mandates to Secure Climate Continuity in Chile.**

Chile demonstrates how legal mandates can institutionalise climate ambition and ensure continuity across political cycles. The country established sectoral limits on carbon emissions by 2030, which will become mandatory following approval of the Draft Framework Law on Climate Change, a legal initiative that sets a target of achieving carbon neutrality no later than 2050. This legal framework provides stability beyond electoral terms, showing how legislation can lock in ambition, enhance policy credibility, and sustain momentum for implementation. See [IDDRI](#) and [Gobierno de Chile](#) for more information [16, 17].

### **BOX 7. Aligning Climate Resilience with Development Priorities in Vietnam.**

Vietnam illustrates how climate resilience can be integrated with core socio-economic development priorities to strengthen political consensus and attract investment. The Mekong Delta Plan, approved by the Prime Minister in 2014, aligned climate resilience with national goals such as rural development, poverty reduction, and economic growth. This alignment helped mobilise international support and encouraged line ministries to coordinate sectoral strategies with climate-resilient scenarios, demonstrating how political buy-in at the highest level can embed climate priorities within long-term planning. In 2017, Resolution 120 on the Sustainable and Climate-Resilient Development of the Mekong Delta of Vietnam further operationalised this approach. It defined a long-term vision to 2100, set objectives for 2050, and established concrete, agency-specific tasks to translate the strategy from plan to action. See [Elliott et al.](#), for more information [5].

### **2.4. Engaging with stakeholders**

The fourth sub-component of Component 1 focuses on engagements with stakeholders. Broad-based consultations and coalition-building are essential to ensuring that climate strategies are credible, legitimate, and practical to implement. This requires more than procedural inclusion, calling for genuine dialogue that acknowledges political economy realities and builds durable support for reform. This is discussed in more detail in Component 5: Engagement, which details how to institutionalise dialogue mechanisms and feedback loops that maintain legitimacy through implementation. However, a successful D2D process needs continuous stakeholder engagement at all stages, and thus this process merits a subcomponent in Component 1. In practice, this process involves initiating consultations early, fostering coalitions that connect state and non-state

actors, and incorporating the perspectives of external partners such as development banks and international investors. This section identifies three core elements that help strengthen stakeholder engagement:

- **Initiating genuine consultations.**
- **Building supportive coalitions.**
- **Incorporating external stakeholders.**

#### **2.4.1. Initiating genuine consultations**

**Early consultation provides space to agree on scope, roles, and expectations, laying the groundwork for an inclusive and credible planning process.** The initial phase of stakeholder engagement is not simply procedural. It can determine the success or failure of the planning process. Early and broad consultations allow governments to define the process to formulate a transition plan, including its scope, approach, and the role of various actors in providing inputs, participating in deliberations, and contributing to decision-making; all under an overall umbrella of how a long-term strategy can complement existing national planning tools and development priorities.

Experience from transition plan development – particularly of the LTS under the 2050 Pathways Platform (2050PP) as well as NDC formulation – demonstrates that this early dialogue between government strategy leads and relevant peers can take several months and should be given the time it requires. When development partners are involved, this phase also demands a deliberate and interactive dialogue to clarify the scope and nature of their support. Rushing these conversations, whether internal or with external partners, can undermine the foundations of a credible and actionable strategy.

### 2.4.2. Building supportive coalitions

**Bringing together diverse interests around shared national objectives helps strengthen the constituency for reform and enhances implementation capacity.** Political economy approaches can add value to the design of consultation processes by mapping the key actors in the energy and transport sectors and clarifying how their interests align or conflict. These actors include not only policymakers, regulators, and state-owned enterprises, but also private investors and civil society organisations. In many cases, successful reform depends not just on convincing political elites but on building coalitions that include technocrats, private sector allies, and civil society groups. Entry points for engagement may arise from policy reviews, donor coordination mechanisms, or even crises that disrupt the status quo.

Understanding these dynamics raises some of the difficult questions that will need to be addressed during consultation processes. Who stands to gain or lose from proposed reforms? Who holds the power to block change? Are there actors who might unexpectedly support reform, either because it aligns with their interests or because they see a political opportunity? Who decides on planning and building transport/energy infrastructure?

### 2.4.3. Incorporating external stakeholders

**Engaging development partners ensures that external resources support rather than reshape domestic priorities.** In many countries, the energy and transport sectors are influenced not only by domestic actors but also by international ones. Multilateral development banks (MDBs) such as the World Bank and regional MDBs such as the African Development Bank or Asian Development Bank, together with bilateral donors and development finance institutions, often play an important role in shaping energy

(and other sector) priorities through financing, technical assistance, and policy dialogue.

These external actors contribute not only financial and technical resources but also bring their own interests and priorities, ranging from advancing global climate goals to promoting regional integration and securing access to strategic resources. International private investors, by contrast, are typically concerned with regulatory certainty and a stable, predictable investment environment. At the same time, climate finance institutions such as the Green Climate Fund are becoming increasingly influential, especially in supporting early-stage or high-risk decarbonisation initiatives.

Effective political economy mapping is also valuable to examine the role of international actors, assessing where their objectives converge with or diverge from national priorities. Large organisations such as MDBs often operate on multiple levels and through diverse workstreams, for example simultaneously via national offices and regional initiatives led from headquarters, which may not always be fully interconnected. Understanding these dynamics is essential for determining how their involvement can be strategically leveraged, or carefully managed, to advance reforms.

### 3. Recommendations

Drawing on global experience in securing political support, and establishing governance structures, as well as lessons from country case studies and the collective expertise of the co-authors, the following recommendations distil key insights into actionable guidance for governments and line ministries. Aligned with the broader D2D framework, they aim to help countries build the political, institutional, and coordination foundations required to design and implement credible transition strategies.

- 1. Executive intent should be formalised through binding administrative or legal instruments that anchor the transition within existing planning and budget systems.** Formally embedding political commitment ensures that the mandate to transition is recognised within government systems rather than depending on individual officeholders. Anchoring the mandate within established planning and budget procedures strengthens accountability and supports continuity across political cycles, while signalling credibility to domestic stakeholders and international partners.
- 2. A Governing Coordination Function (GCF) should be established at the centre of government, with a structured link to the Ministry of Finance to ensure alignment between planning and financing.** Positioning the GCF at the centre of government enables it to convene ministries effectively and connect technical planning to fiscal decision-making. A structured link to the Ministry of Finance ensures that transition priorities can be translated into budgeting and investment decisions, giving the process visibility within national financing systems and external partner engagement.
- 3. A two-tier coordination structure should be institutionalised to link political direction with technical delivery.** The Political Steering Committee (PSC-SIG) provides high-level direction and alignment, while the Technical Delivery Group (TDG-SIG) ensures that analytical work and operational delivery move in step with policy objectives. This arrangement strengthens coherence, accelerates delivery, and enables evidence-based decision-making across government.
- 4. A shared evidence and data platform should be created to enable transparent coordination across ministries and provide the information base required for investment preparation and due diligence.** By offering a single trusted source of information, the platform facilitates coordination, enhances transparency, and enables faster preparation of finance-ready interventions. It also provides clarity to development partners and investors, helping demonstrate readiness and reducing the time required to move from planning to mobilisation.
- 5. Political economy capability should be embedded across core ministries to ensure reforms are sequenced in line with real incentives, institutional constraints, and coalition dynamics.** Developing this capability equips ministries to align policy choices with institutional strengths, deepen collaboration across actors, and design reforms that gain and sustain support. When political economy insight is embedded early, implementation becomes smoother, more coordinated, and more durable over time.

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